15 research outputs found
COVID Down Under: where did Australia's pandemic apps go wrong?
Governments and businesses worldwide deployed a variety of technological
measures to help prevent and track the spread of COVID-19. In Australia, these
applications contained usability, accessibility, and security flaws that
hindered their effectiveness and adoption. Australia, like most countries, has
transitioned to treating COVID as endemic. However it is yet to absorb lessons
from the technological issues with its approach to the pandemic. In this short
paper we provide a systematization of the most notable events; identify and
review different failure modes of these applications; and develop
recommendations for developing apps in the face of future crises. Our work
focuses on a single country. However, Australia's issues are particularly
instructive as they highlight surprisingly pitfalls that countries should
address in the face of a future pandemic
Transactional Scripts in Contract Stacks
Deals accomplished through software persistently residing on computer networks—sometimes called smart contracts, but better termed transactional scripts—embody a potentially revolutionary contracting innovation. Ours is the first precise account in the legal literature of how such scripts are created, and when they produce errors of legal significance.Scripts’ most celebrated use case is for transactions operating exclusively on public, permissionless, blockchains: such exchanges eliminate the need for trusted intermediaries and seem to permit parties to commit ex ante to automated performance. But public transactional scripts are costly both to develop and execute, with significant fees imposed for data storage. Worse, bugs practically can’t be eliminated. The result is that many scripts will terminate in misunderstanding, frustrated intent and failure.When code misdelivers, disappointed parties will seek legal recourse. We argue that jurists should situate scripts within other legally operative statements and disclosures, or contract stacks. Precision about the relationship between script and stack sustains a novel framework, rooted in old doctrines of interpretation, parol evidence and equity, that will help jurists compile answers to the private law problems that digitized exchange entails
A Gentle Tutorial for Lattice-Based Cryptanalysis
The applicability of lattice reduction to a wide variety of cryptographic situations makes it an important part of the cryptanalyst\u27s toolbox. Despite this, the construction of lattices and use of lattice reduction algorithms for cryptanalysis continue to be somewhat difficult to understand for beginners. This tutorial aims to be a gentle but detailed introduction to lattice-based cryptanalysis targeted towards the novice cryptanalyst with little to no background in lattices. We explain some popular attacks through a conceptual model that simplifies the various components of a lattice attack
Detecting Excessive Data Exposures in Web Server Responses with Metamorphic Fuzzing
APIs often transmit far more data to client applications than they need, and
in the context of web applications, often do so over public channels. This
issue, termed Excessive Data Exposure (EDE), was OWASP's third most significant
API vulnerability of 2019. However, there are few automated tools -- either in
research or industry -- to effectively find and remediate such issues. This is
unsurprising as the problem lacks an explicit test oracle: the vulnerability
does not manifest through explicit abnormal behaviours (e.g., program crashes
or memory access violations).
In this work, we develop a metamorphic relation to tackle that challenge and
build the first fuzzing tool -- that we call EDEFuzz -- to systematically
detect EDEs. EDEFuzz can significantly reduce false negatives that occur during
manual inspection and ad-hoc text-matching techniques, the current most-used
approaches.
We tested EDEFuzz against the sixty-nine applicable targets from the Alexa
Top-200 and found 33,365 potential leaks -- illustrating our tool's broad
applicability and scalability. In a more-tightly controlled experiment of eight
popular websites in Australia, EDEFuzz achieved a high true positive rate of
98.65% with minimal configuration, illustrating our tool's accuracy and
efficiency
Coin-Operated Capitalism
This Article presents the legal literature’s first detailed analysis of the inner workings of Initial Coin Offerings. We characterize the ICO as an example of financial innovation, placing it in kinship with venture capital contracting, asset securitization, and (obviously) the IPO. We also take the form seriously as an example of technological innovation, where promoters are beginning to effectuate their promises to investors through computer code, rather than traditional contract. To understand the dynamics of this shift, we first collect contracts, “white papers,” and other contract-like documents for the fifty top-grossing ICOs of 2017. We then analyze how such projects’ software code reflected (or failed to reflect) their contractual promises. Our inquiry reveals that many ICOs failed even to promise that they would protect investors against insider self-dealing. Fewer still manifested such contracts in code. Surprisingly, in a community known for espousing a technolibertarian belief in the power of “trustless trust” built with carefully designed code, a significant fraction of issuers retained centralized control through previously undisclosed code permitting modification of the entities’ governing structures. These findings offer valuable lessons to legal scholars, economists, and policymakers about the roles played by gatekeepers; about the value of regulation; and the possibilities for socially valuable private ordering in a relatively anonymous, decentralized environment
Factoring as a Service
The difficulty of integer factorization is fundamental to modern cryptographic security using RSA encryption and signatures. Although a 512-bit RSA modulus was first factored in 1999, 512-bit RSA remains surprisingly common in practice across many cryptographic protocols. Popular understanding of the difficulty of 512-bit factorization does not seem to have kept pace with developments in computing power. In this paper, we optimize the CADO-NFS and Msieve implementations of the number field sieve for use on the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud platform, allowing a non-expert to factor 512-bit RSA public keys in under four hours for \$75. We go on to survey the RSA key sizes used in popular protocols, finding hundreds or thousands of deployed 512-bit RSA keys in DNSSEC, HTTPS, IMAP, POP3, SMTP, DKIM, SSH, and PGP
Measuring small subgroup attacks against Diffie-Hellman
Several recent standards, including NIST SP 800- 56A and RFC 5114, advocate the use of “DSA” parameters for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. While it is possible to use such parameters securely, additional validation checks are necessary to prevent well-known and potentially devastating attacks. In this paper, we observe that many Diffie-Hellman implementations do not properly validate key exchange inputs. Combined with other protocol properties and implementation choices, this can radically decrease security. We measure the prevalence of these parameter choices in the wild for HTTPS, POP3S, SMTP with STARTTLS, SSH, IKEv1, and IKEv2, finding millions of hosts using DSA and other non-“safe” primes for Diffie-Hellman key exchange, many of them in combination with potentially vulnerable behaviors. We examine over 20 open-source cryptographic libraries and applications and observe that until January 2016, not a single one validated subgroup orders by default. We found feasible full or partial key recovery vulnerabilities in OpenSSL, the Exim mail server, the Unbound DNS client, and Amazon’s load balancer, as well as susceptibility to weaker attacks in many other applications
A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident
In December 2015, Juniper Networks announced that unknown attackers had added
unauthorized code to ScreenOS, the operating system for their NetScreen VPN routers. This code created two vulnerabilities: an authentication bypass that enabled remote administrative access, and a second vulnerability that allowed passive decryption of VPN traffic. Reverse engineering of ScreenOS binaries revealed that the first of these vulnerabilities was a conventional back door in the SSH password checker. The second is far more intriguing: a change to the Q parameter used by the Dual EC pseudorandom number generator. It is widely known that Dual EC has the unfortunate property that an attacker with the ability to choose Q can, from a small sample of the generator\u27s output, predict all future outputs. In a 2013 public statement, Juniper noted the use of Dual EC but claimed that ScreenOS included countermeasures that neutralized this form of attack.
In this work, we report the results of a thorough independent analysis of the
ScreenOS randomness subsystem, as well as its interaction with the IKE VPN key
establishment protocol. Due to apparent flaws in the code, Juniper\u27s countermeasures against a Dual EC attack are never executed. Moreover, by comparing sequential
versions of ScreenOS, we identify a cluster of additional changes that were introduced concurrently with the inclusion of Dual EC in a single 2008 release. Taken as a whole, these changes render the ScreenOS system vulnerable to passive exploitation by an attacker who selects Q. We demonstrate this by installing our own parameters, and showing that it is possible to passively decrypt a single IKE handshake and its associated VPN traffic in isolation without observing any other network traffic